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I
Introduction
The recent case involving the Napster music file sharing system'
has highlighted the potential for copyright infringement over the
Internet. Rapidly advancing technology, the vast expansion in the
number of Internet users, and the extraordinary volume of
information that travels over the Internet, all present difficult
problems in dealing with copyright infringement.
Another aspect of the Internet that contributes to the difficulty
in policing copyright infringement is the inherently international
nature of the medium. A website hosted by a server located in the
most remote location can be accessed by millions of people all over
the world. This article will attempt to identify some of the more
complicated copyright enforcement issues that exist due to the
international character of the Internet. This article will also describe
some of the current legal devices available to combat international
copyright infringement, such as: (1) the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act ("DMCA");2 (2) the European Union Directive on Electronic
Commerce;3 (3) the World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the
related Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property ("TRIPS");' (4) the recent World Intellectual Property
Organization ("WIPO") Copyright Treaty5 and Performances and
Phonograms Treaty;6 (5) the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA");7 and (6) Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.' This
article will discuss the potential application of each of these bodies of
law to the Internet, and their shortcomings when applied to the
Internet. Finally, this article will set forth some suggestions as to how
the current international system of copyright enforcement might be
1. A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
3. Directive on Electronic Commerce (Feb. 28, 2000) Common Position (EC) No.
22/2000.
4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Property Rights (Dec. 15, 1993)
33 I.L.M. 81.
5. WIPO Copyright Treaty (Dec. 20, 1996), Sen. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17.
6. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (Dec. 20, 1996) Sen. Treaty Doc.
No. 105-17.
7. North American Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the United
States of America, the Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican
States (Dec. 17, 1992).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1996).
strengthened in the context of the Internet.
This article is written from the perspective of the practical
problems that are likely to affect markets and companies in the
United States ("U.S.") with respect to copyright enforcement beyond
U.S. borders. Time and space limitations do not permit a discussion
of these issues from the viewpoint of the multitude of countries that
are likely to have disparate interests and priorities.
II
The Problem
A. Historic Problems the United States has Encountered with
International Copyright Enforcement
Historically, there has been friction, especially between the
developed and the developing world, with respect to copyright
enforcement. Over the last 30 years, the U.S. and Europe have
persistently applied pressure to countries around the world in an
effort to get them to enact and enforce copyright laws at a level that
at least reduces or eliminates blatant piracy..
The U.S., for some time, has been imposing pressure on
numerous countries to improve their enforcement of intellectual
property rights.9 For example, over the last decade, the U.S. has
repeatedly threatened trade sanctions against China, because it has
been a major source of pirated products.' In the 1990s, the U.S.
entered into two bi-lateral trade agreements with China concerning
intellectual property protection." The Clinton Administration
claimed to have made progress with China on this issue, stating:
[b]efore concluding an Intellectual Property Agreement in
1995 and the enforcement action in 1996, China was one of
the world's largest producers and exporters of copyrighted
products. Today, China has improved its legal framework,
and copyright enforcement has improved."
The Clinton Administration acknowledged, however, that adequate
copyright enforcement in China remains a problem. 3
9. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Fact Sheet: Monitoring and Enforcing
Trade Laws and Agreements (May 1, 2000).
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The U.S. has cited numerous other countries as candidates for
sanctions due to lax intellectual property protection. As of May 2000,
there were 18 countries on the "Special 301" list of countries that the
office of United States Trade Representative ("USTR") "annually
identifies that deny adequate and effective protection for intellectual
property rights or deny fair and equitable market access for persons
that rely on intellectual property protection."'4 The USTR places
countries with the "most onerous and egregious practices" on this
priority list,"5 including China, Brazil, Thailand and Paraguay.
16
However, countries the U.S. has identified as having lax enforcement
of intellectual property laws are not limited to the developing world.
Disputes have arisen between the U.S. and Sweden, Portugal, Japan,
and Ireland because the U.S. feels these countries have fouled
copyright protection. 7 Another dispute involved Greece's failure to
prevent television stations from blatant broadcasting of copyrighted
motion pictures and television programs. 8
Multilateral efforts, such as the implementation of TRIPS (as
part of the WTO), and NAFTA have been hailed as major
advancements in the effort to achieve strong worldwide enforcement
of copyright protection." The USTR has identified numerous
instances where, through these international institutions, compliance
with international standards of copyright protection has been
achieved." However, with the continued rapid proliferation of the
Internet, international enforcement of intellectual property rights
will remain a significant and increasingly daunting challenge.
B.. Overview of Problems Created by the Internet
The rapid development of the Internet is already resulting in
significant new challenges to owners of copyrights. File sharing
systems like Napster and Gnutella highlight what may be only the tip
of the proverbial iceberg with respect to the legal, technical and
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 7-11.
17. Id. at 17. While these countries have not been placed on the Section 301 list, the
U.S. has complained of action (or inaction) by these countries through the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding.
18. Id. at 21.
19. USTR Fact Sheet, supra. n. 9 at 1, 17; Scott A. McKenzie, Global Protection of
Trademark Intellectual Property Rights: A Comparison of Infringement and Remedies
Available in China Versus the European Union, 34 Gonz. L. Rev. 529, 540 (1998/1999);
Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual Property
Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 769 (1997).
20. USTR Fact Sheet, supra n. 9, at 17.
practical problems the Internet can cause for intellectual property
owners. The Internet makes it possible for large numbers of people
to rapidly copy protected materials worldwide. With software like
Gnutella, they can do so without any centralized clearinghouse that
intellectual property owners could target in an effort to enforce
copyright protection, such as Napster2 Such developments have led
some to hypothesize that copyright law is dead because technology is
so far ahead of the law that enforcement is impossible, and should
not even be attempted." It is beyond the scope of this article to
challenge or analyze such theories concerning the demise of
copyright law or to discuss whether enforcement of Internet
infringement should be undertaken. Rather, for purposes of this
article, it will be assumed that since copyright laws remain on the
books, an attempt should be made to enforce them. However, it
cannot be denied that the Internet, and new technologies related to
the Internet, present difficult challenges for copyright law to remain
an effective means to protect creative expression.
C. Overview of International Problems Concerning the Internet
One of the new challenges presented by the Internet is the effect
it will have on international enforcement of copyrights. Even if
international law is able to effectively meet the challenges presented
by technology, the problem of worldwide enforcement across
sovereign borders will remain a problem. For example, as things
currently stand, it appears that federal courts are on the verge of
shutting down Napster.23 It is inevitable, however, that someone
outside the U.S. will develop a similar website. If such an offshore
website becomes popular, especially within the U.S., the result in
Napster will quickly turn into a hollow victory for the recording
industry. A Napster-like website in Paraguay, China or Thailand, for
example, would have the capability of being accessed by the same
millions of Americans who frequented the Napster website. There is
no added cost or inconvenience for a web surfer to access a website
with servers outside of the U.S. It is just as easy to access a website
hosted by a server in Siberia as it is to access a site with a server in
the Silicon Valley. Thus, if and when U.S. legislatures and courts
21. Compare the description of Gnutella <http://www.gnutella.wego.com>
(accessed Nov. 9, 2001), with the description of Napster, A & M Records, 239 F.3d at
1011.
22. John Barlow, The Next Economy of Ideas, Will Copyright Survive the Napster
Bomb? Nope, but Creativity Will, 8.10 Wired Magazine 240 (October 2000).
23. A & M Records. 239 F.3d at 1011.
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develop better ways to address application of copyright laws to the
Internet, there will be a strong incentive for those who engage in
copyright piracy, or for those who otherwise profit from the
unauthorized use of intellectual property belonging to others, to
move offshore.
The authorities in the U.S. now face similar challenges with
respect to offshore gambling." Despite relatively straightforward laws
prohibiting bookmaking from outside the U.S., the authorities have
been unable to shut down the multitude of offshore Internet
gambling sites.25
The problem with preventing international piracy of copyrights
is not limited to musical works as was the issue in Napster.
Theoretically, the same level of infringement can occur with
computer programs, visual artwork (especially as the quality of
computer graphics and printers continue to improve) and literary
works (especially if digital books become popular). Nor is the scope
of the problem limited to Napster-like technology. An offshore
infringer need not necessarily have the sophistication to offer such
file-sharing technology. The Napster file-sharing model allowed
Napster customers to share music files without Napster's
involvement, with the Napster website merely facilitating the initial
contact between those customers. 26 Such file-sharing methodology
allowed Napster to argue that it was not copying any copyrighted
technology, and thus was not a direct infringer. 27 Although the court
held that the plaintiff copyright owners had made out a prima facie
case that Napster's users directly infringed their works, in order to
state a claim against Napster itself, the plaintiffs had to make the
more difficult showing that Napster was secondarily liable for
infringement under the doctrine of contributory infringement or
vicarious infringement. 28 However, if an unscrupulous website
operator locates his servers in a country where he is confident that
there will be no effective enforcement efforts against him, he could
offer pirated copyright materials directly, rather than bothering with
a more complicated file-sharing system.
24. Dossick & Halberstadter, Facing the Music: The Fate of Napster Will Have Far-
Reaching Implications for the Distribution of All Forms of Entertainment over the Internet,
24 A.P.R. L.A. Law 34, 42 (April, 2001).
25. Id.
26. A & M Records, 239 F.3d at 1011.
27. Id. at 1014.
28. Id. at 1019.
1. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Issues
Some of the most difficult problems concerning international
enforcement of copyrights with respect to the Internet are: (1)
determining which sovereign has jurisdiction over the matter in
situations where the server hosting the website containing infringing
materials is located in one country, but is accessed by a substantial
number of users in another country; and (2) determining which
country's law should apply in such situations. U.S. courts have
struggled with these questions in attempting to determine whether
there is jurisdiction with respect to multi-state Internet issues. Using
the minimum contacts analysis under U.S. constitutional law, the
courts have generally focused on the degree to which a website is
merely passive as opposed to interactive.29 If a website located in
State A conducts business with customers in State B, then State B is
likely to impose jurisdiction over the owner of the website. °
The problem in an international context is even more
complicated. Jurisdiction in the U.S. is generally analyzed based on
due process principles set forth in the federal Constitution,31 so the
analysis from state to state is similar.32 Jurisdictional analysis in
different countries does not have the same common genesis, and thus
can widely vary. Moreover, international enforcement of copyright
laws does not have the benefit of a single court system or of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which mandates
that state court judgments of one state be recognized by other
states.3  Thus, even if a copyright owner were successful in convincing
a U.S. court that it had jurisdiction over an infringing website
operating in a foreign country, it would not necessarily follow that a
court order shutting down that website could be enforced or have any
effect in the country where the server is located.
Americans have a tendency to view extraterritorial application
of our laws favorably in order to protect our interests.3" However, if
we are to be intellectually honest, we should proceed cautiously on
this issue. The converse situation-foreign courts imposing
29. See Cybersell v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Zippo
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F.2d 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).
30. See Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 418.
31. U.S. Const., amend. XIV.
32. See Cybersell and Zippo, supra n. 29.
33. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1.
34. A.V. Lowe, Blocking Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The British Protection of
Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 A.J.I.L 257, 264 (April, 1981); Graeme W. Austin,
Domestic Laws and Foreign Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright
Infringement Litigation, 23 Colum.-VLA & Arts 1, 19 (Winter 1999).
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jurisdiction over U.S.-based websites-is likely to prove more
controversial. This has already occurred with respect to non-
copyright issues. For example, in a suit brought by several French
non-profit organizations, a French court issued a ruling that forced
Yahoo! (an Internet company that operates a U.S.-based website
which conducts auctions) to block access to auctions offering Nazi
paraphernalia.35 The rationale for the ruling was expressed, in part, as
follows:
Whereas the exposition for the purpose of sale of Nazi
objects constitutes a violation of French law (article R.645-2
of the Criminal Code) as well as an offence against the
collective memory of a country profoundly wounded by the
atrocities committed by and in the name of a Nazi criminal
enterprise against its citizens and most importantly against
its citizens of the Jewish religion;
Whereas while permitting the visualization in France of
these objects and eventual participation of a surfer
established in France in such an exposition/sale, Yahoo!,
Inc. thus has committed a wrong on the territory of France,
a wrong, the unintentional nature of which is apparent, but
which is the cause of harm to the [complainants], regardless
of the fact that the litigious activity is marginal in relation
with the entire business of the auction sales service on its
site Yahoo.com site;
Whereas the harm is suffered in France, our jurisdiction is
therefore competent over this matter pursuant to Article 46
of the new Code of Civil Procedure.36
Yahoo! argued to the French court that it was not technically
feasible to block access to the auction site to French users only.37
However, the court appeared to be skeptical of such a claim,
concluding that they "do not constitute insurmountable obstacles."38
After the ruling, the French court appointed a panel of experts to
find a way to block access to Yahoo! auctions of memorabilia.3 9 The
report, issued on November 6, 2000, concluded that a filtering system
35. Daniel Lapr~s, Union des Etudiants Juifs de France v. Yahoo!, Inc., Superior




39. e-Commerce Times, Experts to Probe Yahoo! Nazi Auctions <http://www.
ecommercetimes.com/porl/printer/ 402 0/7> (Aug. 14, 2000).
could be devised that would bar users with French-based IP addresses
from accessing the auctions." Shortly after the report was issued, the
French court ruled that Yahoo! had 90 days to block French residents
from access to the auctions of Nazi memorabilia.4
Yahoo! then filed suit against the French non-profit plaintiffs in
U.S. federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that the French
court had no jurisdiction over Yahoo! operations, and that the
French court's ruling violated the U.S. Constitution.2 The French
non-profits filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the U.S. court
lacked personal jurisdiction over them.43 Yahoo! was thus placed in
the ironic position of arguing in favor of jurisdiction by the U.S. court
while effectively arguing against the jurisdiction of the French court.
Nevertheless, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California denied the French non-profits' motion to dismiss.44 The
court addressed the personal jurisdiction issue under traditional
minimum contacts analysis.4 The court found that the French non-
profits had purposely availed themselves of the privilege of
conducting activities in California by: (1) issuing a cease and desist
letter to Yahoo! at its California offices; (2) requesting the French
court to issue an order requiring Yahoo! to perform physical acts in
California; and (3) causing Yahoo! to be served in California with
process of the French court.46 The court further concluded:
[T]he application of the effects test is fully consistent not
only with the rationale of the test but also with traditional
principles of personal jurisdiction and international law.
While filing a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction may be
entirely proper under the laws of that jurisdiction, such an
act may be wrongful from the standpoint of a court in the
United States if its primary purpose or intended effect is to
deprive a United States resident of its constitutional rights.
The court also considered the reasonableness of imposing
40. e-Commerce Times, Yahoo! Ordered to Bar French from Nazi Auctions <http://
www.ecommercetimes.com/porl/printer/15406/7> (accessed Nov. 7, 2000).
41. Id.
42. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue le Racisme et 'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168,
1171 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1180.
45. Id. at 1173.
46. Id. at 1174.
47. Id. at 1175.
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personal jurisdiction over the French non-profits." As part of its
discussion on this point the court addressed the conflict with French
sovereignty:
The instant action involves only the limited question of
whether this Court should recognize and enforce a French
Order which requires Yahoo! to censor its United States-
based services to conform to French penal law. While this
Court must and does accord great respect and deference to
France's sovereign interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts, this interest must be weighed
against the United States' own sovereign interest in
protecting the constitutional and statutory rights of its
citizens.49
It will be interesting to see how substantive decisions by the U.S.
court in Yahoo! will affect international relations and principles of
comity. It is also worth noting that Yahoo! sued the French non-
profits," but the source of the potential harm to Yahoo!, if any, is the
actions taken by the French court. It could be questioned, in these
circumstances, whether Yahoo! has stated a valid claim for relief
against the non-profits. One also might wonder about the extent to
which a declaratory judgment in Yahoo!'s favor will impact the
French court's ruling. Although the U.S. courts might refuse to
enforce the French court's order, it is unlikely that a U.S. court can
effectively enjoin the French court from taking action to enforce its
own order. Such questions point to the potential for significant
friction should the U.S. courts issue substantive rulings that conflict
with the rulings of other countries' courts. "
Yahoo! does not appear to be an aberration. In December 2000,
Germany's highest court ruled that material accessible from a
website located outside of Germany could form the basis for a
criminal conviction for expressing pro-Nazi sentiments. The
conviction was affirmed even though the website was based in
48. Id. at 1177.
49. Id. at 1178.
50. Id. at 1171.
51. Despite Yahoo!'s continued legal challenge to the French court's ruling, the
company apparently capitulated in January of 2001, announcing that it would ban the
auction of Nazi artifacts from its auction website. e-Commerce Times, Yahoo! to Ban
Nazi-Related Auctions <http://www.ecommercetimes.com/porl/printer/6 432 /7> (Jan. 3,
2001). Nevertheless, Yahoo apparently is intent on pursuing its federal court action in this
matter.
52. Robert Weisman, Germany Bans Foreign Website for Nazi Content <http://
www.newsfactor.com/perl/printer/60637> (accessed Nov. 7, 2001).
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Australia and the defendant, though born in Germany, had lived in
Australia most of his life and was an Australian citizen. 3 In another
case, a German court imposed a criminal sanction against an
executive.of a U.S.-based Internet service provider ("ISP") merely
because the ISP provided Internet access to a German citizen who
then had the ability to access offensive material (child pornography),
which the ISP did not sanction or control 4
These rulings would generally be considered antithetical to
American notions and traditions of free speech and due process
rights. However, this is likely to be only the beginning of the
international friction that will develop as a result of countries'
attempts to apply their respective laws to the Internet. For example,
there are significant differences between the U.S. and the United
Kingdom ("U.K.") with respect to the law of defamation. In the U.K.
it is much easier to sue for libel or slander, especially for public
figures, as there is no "actual malice" requirement as there is in the
U.S. under New York Times v. Sullivan." It is only a matter of time
before there is a controversy over an English court imposing
sanctions for defamation against a U.S.-based website under
circumstances in which there would be no liability under U.S. law.
Future conflicts over differences in copyright laws where the
Internet is concerned are likely. For example, Europeans generally
recognize the concept of moral rights, which gives an artist a
continuing level of control over his or her work, despite the fact that
the work may have been sold. 6 By way of illustration, if an artist
creates a black and white movie but relinquishes his copyright in it,
the artist still retains the moral right to prevent the current copyright
owner from colorizing that movie. In the U.S., moral rights are very
limited, and the original creator would have very little or no recourse
to prevent modification or even destruction of his work after it is
sold. 7 In the context of the Internet, if a European court were to rule
that a website violated the moral rights of a creative artist, and such
ruling were enforced worldwide, this could lead to the denial of
access to materials by Americans which would be perfectly legal to
53. Id.
54. Germany v. Somm, No. 8340 Os465 JS 173158/95 (1998) (conviction eventually
reversed by higher court); CompuServe Exec's Conviction Tossed, Associated Press (Nov.
17, 1999).
55. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); K. Wimmer & J. Berman,
United States Jurisdiction to Enforce Internet Libel Judgments, 630 PLI/Pat. 493 (2000):
56. Stephen M. McJohn, The Paradoxes of Free Software, 9 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 25,
45-46 (Fall 2001).
57. Id.
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view in the U.S.
Similarly, if the U.S. courts had ruled that Napster was not an
infringer and allowed it to continue, it would be interesting to
consider what the reaction in the U.S. would have been if the court of
a foreign country with stricter copyright laws shut down Napster and
thereby deprived U.S. consumers access to that service.
III
The Digital Millenium Copyright Act
A. Protection of ISPs and Procedure for Resolving Copyright
Disputes
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA" or "Act")
58
was enacted in the U.S. in 1998 to address various problems
concerning copyright infringement. 9 One of the primary concerns
addressed by the DMCA is the problem of ISPs and other service
providers, such as bulletin board service ("BBS") operators, having
potential liability for copyright infringement merely because
infringers use their services. This problem was illustrated by Religious
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,
Inc.' in which copyright holders sued an ISP and a BBS operator for
infringement as a result of an individual's posting of certain allegedly
infringing material on the bulletin board.6 After the copyright
holders learned of the posting, they demanded that the ISP and BBS
operator take the material down.62 In response, the BBS operator
asked the plaintiffs to prove that they owned the copyright in the
materials.63 The ISP refused the plaintiff's request, contending that it
was impossible for it to police and prescreen materials for potential
copyright violations. ' The court held that neither the BBS operator
nor the ISP were direct infringers because they did not take any
affirmative steps to actually make copies.65 With respect to the ISP,
the court appeared to be persuaded by the practical difficulty of
imposing a duty on ISPs to police the massive content on the Internet
58. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
59. See generally id.
60. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) [hereinafter "RTC"].
61. Id. at 1365.
62. Id. at 1366.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1372, 1381-82.
for copyright infringement. 6 However, on the claim for contributory
infringement, the court left the door open to liability against the ISP
and BBS operator by refusing to grant summary judgment, and
holding that if the plaintiffs could prove sufficient knowledge on the
part of the defendants, given the notice received from the plaintiffs,
such circumstances might be sufficient to impose liability.67 The court
indicated that vicarious liability against the defendants was not a
viable theory because there was no evidence that the infringement
was of direct financial benefit to them. 6 Finally, the court determined
that whether the doctrine of fair use applied was a question of fact. 69.
Obviously, RTC and cases like it resulted in serious concerns
regarding liability of the Internet industry. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, for ISPs to screen the entire Internet for possible
copyright infringement, and it could be argued that doing so would
chill the free flow of ideas and materials over the Internet. If, as
suggested by the RTC court, an ISP has potential liability for
copyright infringement once it receives notice from a copyright
owner of the infringement, ISPs would be in the untenable position
of arbitrating the validity of copyright claims. It also would have a
likely chilling effect since the ISPs would have a natural tendency to
take materials off the Internet rather than be put in the middle of
such disputes.
In an attempt to address concerns such as these, the DMCA sets
forth procedures for resolving situations such as those involved in
RTC. First, the DMCA grants ISPs broad immunity from liability for
copyright infringement where information is transmitted or posted
over the Internet via an ISP, but at the initiation of others.7" The
DMCA further provides a procedure for resolving claims of
copyright infringement with respect to materials residing on ISPs'
systems or networks (e.g., an ISP's servers) and with respect to the
ISPs providing access or links to infringing materials.7 In either
situation, the ISP is granted immunity if certain conditions are met
such as a lack of knowledge or financial benefit.72 As a condition of
receiving such immunity, the ISP is also required to designate an
agent to receive notifications of claimed infringement.73 If sufficient
66. Id. at 1369-72.
67. Id. at 1373-75, 1382.
68. Id. at 1375-77, 1382.
69. Id. at 1378-81.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
71. Id. §§ 512 (c), (d).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 512(c)(2).
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notification (as described in the Act) is received, the ISP must, in
turn, remove or disable access to the material." In order to avoid
liability for removing the material or disabling access, the ISP must
notify the subscriber (the person who posted the information on the
ISP's system) of such removal.75 Upon receipt of sufficient counter-
notification from the subscriber (which must include a consent to
federal court jurisdiction), the ISP must provide further notice to the
person who is claiming infringement, informing him that the ISP will
replace the allegedly infringing material and/or cease blocking access
thereto unless it receives notice within 10 to 14 days that the claimant
has filed suit against the alleged infringer. 6
The above procedure is an attempt to balance the competing
rights of the copyright owners., those who provide content on the
Internet, the consumers of information over the Internet, and the
ISPs. It can be argued that this system is imperfect because it
provides too much protection for ISPs, and gives copyright owners
with significant resources (such as the recording industry) too much
power to stifle the expression of individual content providers or to
stifle competition by their weaker competitors. Some might argue
that many individual content providers are unlikely to have the
resources or sophistication to challenge the removal of their
materials even if they have legitimate defenses to infringement
claims. Such persons may capitulate and decline to submit counter-
notifications to keep legitimate materials on-line. One could argue
that the public at large will be deprived of the free flow of important
ideas and expression. On the other hand, it also can be argued that,
given the volume of content on the Internet, the DMCA will be
ineffective because it cannot possibly police even blatant
infringement.
Despite the potential for abuses and ineffectiveness, the DMCA
appears to be a useful tool for combating Internet infringement with
respect to materials posted through U.S.-based ISPs. Even with
respect to copyright infringers located outside the U.S., the DMCA
will have some effect, since, if a counter-notification is received from
a subscriber located outside the U.S., such counter-notification must
include a statement that: a) the subscriber consents to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Court for any judicial district in which the service
provider may be found, and b) the subscriber will accept service of
process from the person who provided notification of the
74. Id. § 512.
75. Id. § 512(g).
76. Id.
infringement.77
The DMCA thus is likely to be effective with respect to
international copyright infringement when an ISP doing business in
the U.S. is involved. Such ISPs are likely to utilize the procedures set
forth in the DMCA so that they can enjoy the broad immunity from
liability granted under the Act. Even when a server that hosts
infringing material is located offshore, a copyright owner might
utilize the DMCA to prevent access to the website by demanding that
domestic ISPs block access to it.
However, there are numerous potential holes that are likely to
appear if the DMCA is relied upon as the dike holding back the flood
of international copyright infringement over the Internet. For
example, ISPs who do not do business in the U.S., and are not subject
to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, can choose to ignore notifications of
infringement without suffering any consequence in the U.S., since
they are not likely to be concerned with achieving immunity in the
U.S. Moreover, offshore and domestic copyright infringers who post
materials using their own servers, rather than utilizing the services of
an ISP, are not likely to be effected by the DMCA, except to the
extent that access to their websites might be blocked by the ISPs
doing business in the U.S.
Finally, it is not necessary for a user to utilize an ISP in order to
access the Internet. For example, a "business may be directly
connected to the Internet via a local area network ("LAN") or other
connection. In [such a] case, an ISP wouldn't be needed to get onto
the Web."78 Consequently, the blocking of access by ISPs can be
technically circumvented. Currently, most people in the U.S. access
the Internet through the services of an ISP, but there is no guarantee
this will continue. There is a danger that, in the future, U.S.-based
ISPs will be required to block access not only to websites with
infringing materials, but also to websites that contain pornography or
permit gambling. If access to popular websites through ISPs becomes
too restrictive, many people will likely opt to access the Internet
directly, without an ISP. If this occurs, the DMCA's effectiveness as a
tool to combat copyright infringement will be eviscerated.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(3)(D).
78. Preston Coralla, How the Internet Works (MacMillan Computer Publishing
1999).
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1. Anti-Circumvention Provisions
Another portion of the DMCA addresses circumvention of
technical measures designed to protect against infringing activities.7 9
Among the operative provisions are those that: (1) prohibit
circumvention of a technical measure that effectively controls access
to a work;8° (2) prohibit manufacture, import, offers to the public,
providing, or trafficking in any technology, services, or products that
are designed primarily to circumvent technical measures to protect
copyright owners;" and (3) prohibit the removal of copyright
management information (i.e., information to identify the work
and/or its source).
Cases involving these anti-circumvention provisions have
broadly interpreted the ban on circumvention and narrowly applied
the various exemptions and limitations of the statute. "
Consequently, these provisions have been criticized as giving too
much authority to copyright owners over use of their works.8
One widely publicized case involving this statute involved a 15
year-old Norwegian boy named Jon Johansen, who developed a
computer program capable of decrypting movie DVDs that had been
encrypted by the movie industry." Johansen posted his program on
the Internet.86 Subsequently, an American named Eric Corley posted
the codes for Johansen's program on the Internet."' The movie
studios filed suit against Corley and others in federal court alleging
violations of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA,"8 and
obtained an injunction prohibiting the defendants from trafficking in
the offending program.89  In 1999, Norwegian prosecutors filed
criminal charges against Johansen for his activities. 9
Anti-circumvention laws are fairly potent tools for copyright
owners to combat infringement. As reflected in recent WIPO
79. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
80. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
81. Id. § 1201(b).
82. Id. § 1202.
83. Eddan Katz, Realworks, Inc. v. Streambox & Universal City Studios v.
Reimerdes, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 53 (2001).
84. Id.
85. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 312 n. 83.
88. Id. at 312.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 311.
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treaties91 and pending legislation in the European Union,' there is
international recognition of the need for such protection. However,
the actual protection of copyrights will likely only be as good as the
technological measures that are developed by copyright owners.
Moreover, international enforcement of provisions prohibiting anti-
circumvention of technical measures will likely face many of the same
challenges as enforcement of substantive copyright laws, since many
countries are not likely to have much motivation or interest in
policing such matters.
IV
The European Union Directive on Electronic Commerce
In June 2000, the European Union ("EU") enacted the Directive
on Electronic Commerce (hereinafter the "E-Commerce
Directive").93 Part of this omnibus legislation is modeled after the
DMCA and addresses ISP liability.94 Section 4 of the E-Commerce
Directive mandates that member states exempt ISPs from liability
where: (1) the ISP is a mere conduit and does not initiate the
offending transmission; (2) the ISP is merely temporarily storing
information ("caching"); and (3) where the ISP is a "host," storing
information of its customers. 9 However, with respect to caching and
web-hosting, the ISP's immunity does not continue once it has
knowledge that the information is illegal. Still, there is no general
obligation for the ISP to monitor information that it transmits or
stores.96 For example, with respect to hosting, ISPs are not liable
when:
(1) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal
activity or information and, as regards claims of damages, is
not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal
activity or information is apparent; or
(2) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or
awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to
91. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra n. 5, at Art. 11.
92. European Prepatory Acts, EU Legislation under Preparation, Amended Proposal
for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, Art. 6-97/0359 (May 25, 1999).
93. Directive on Electronic Commerce, supra n. 3.
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the information. 9
Unlike the DMCA, the E-Commerce Directive does not contain
any provision for a content provider to receive notice or submit
counter-notice in order to compel the ISP to re-post its content.
Rather, the Directive contains vague references to encouraging
settlement of disputes.9 The Directive states, in part:
Member States shall ensure that, in the event of
disagreement between an information society service
provider and the recipient of service, their legislation does
not hamper the use of out-of-court schemes, available under
national law, for dispute settlement, including appropriate
electronic means.
Member States shall encourage bodies responsible for the
out-of-court settlement of, in particular, consumer disputes
to operate in a way that provides adequate procedural
guarantees for the parties concerned.99
The E-Commerce Directive and the DMCA are similar in that
they both provide for broad immunity for ISPs, apparently on
recognition that it is unfair to impose liability merely because ISPs
act as a conduit, temporarily storing information or hosting websites.
Both statutory schemes recognize that such immunity should not
extend to situations in which the ISP participates in providing
infringing content. However, the E-Commerce Directive appears to
make it easier than the DMCA to impose liability on the ISP once it
acquires actual knowledge of the infringing activity.1"
Moreover, the lack of any notice or counter-notice provisions in
the EU scheme makes it friendlier to intellectual property owners
than the DMCA. Under the E-Commerce Directive, ISPs are
compelled to remove materials once they receive notice from an
intellectual property owner claiming that the materials infringe."'
The content provider of the allegedly infringing material appears to
have little recourse but to initiate legal action."2 In contrast, the
DMCA procedures require that the ISP re-post the offending
97. Id. at Ch. II, § 4, Art. 15.
98. Id.
99. Id. at Ch. III, Art. 17.
100. Id. at Ch. II, § 4, Art. 15.
101. Id. at Ch. II, § 4, Art. 13-14.
102. Id.
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materials if the content provider receives a counter-notice. 3 Thus,
under the EU scheme, materials are likely to be removed from the
Internet even when there is a questionable claim of infringement or
when there is a meritorious defense to an infringement claim, such as
fair use. In Europe, innocent content providers without sufficient
financial wherewithal or incentive are unlikely to challenge the
removal of their materials. Thus, one could argue that the European
system goes too far in favor of protection at the expense of freedom
of expression.
The E-Commerce Directive does not address circumvention of
technical measures. However, there is pending legislation before the
EU which, similar to the DMCA, mandates that member states
"provide adequate legal protection against the circumvention without
authority of any effective technical measures designed to protect any
copyright or any rights related to copyright."'1"4
V
The WTO and TRIPS
In December of 1994, the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") was completed, and it went into effect
on January 1, 1995. '05 To date, most of the major countries of the
world have acceded to the WTO Agreement and become members of
the WTO, or are in the process of doing so. The WTO framework has
facilitated adoption of subsequent agreements relating to specific
issues and industries, including the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") 6 and the Understanding
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
-(,,DSU,,).1°7
A. TRIPS
TRIPS imposes certain minimum obligations on WTO members
with respect to the protection of intellectual property. Members,
however, are free to implement more extensive protection and to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of
103. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g).
104. European Prepatory Act, supra n. 92.
105. 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
106. Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intell. Property Rights (Dec. 15, 1993); 33 I.L.M. 81.
107. Agreement Establishing the WTO, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (Dec. 15, 1993); 33 I.L.M. 81.
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the agreement within their own systems and practices.'08 TRIPS
reinforces the general WTO principles of: (1) National Treatment:
requiring that members treat nationals of other members the same as
their own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual
property;"° and (2) Most Favored Nation Treatment: requiring that
members treat nationals of any one member country the same as the
nationals of any other member country."'
TRIPS requires that all members comply with the Berne
Convention,"' which specifically provides for the protection of
literary and artistic works."2 Among the rights granted under the
Berne Convention are the right to National Treatment and the right
to be free from formalities."3 Authors are to have the exclusive rights
of reproduction, broadcasting and adaptation,"' although member
countries are permitted to grant fair use exceptions within certain
parameters. " ' With respect to enforcement under TRIPS, members
have no obligation to adhere to Article 6 bis of the Berne
Convention, "6 which imposes the requirement that moral rights be
enforced."7
TRIPS itself also provides for minimum protection of certain
types of works."8 Computer programs are to be protected as literary
works under the Berne Convention."9 Compilations of data are to be
protected to the extent they constitute intellectual creations.' TRIPS
contains a special provision relating to the rental of computer
programs and cinematographic works that allows members to permit
rentals without the author's authorization, unless such rentals have
led to widespread copying, which impairs the author's right of
reproduction.'2 TRIPS also explicitly provides protection for
performers and producers of sound recordings,22 including the right
108. TRIPS, Art. 1.1.
109. Id. at Art. 1.3, 3.
110. Id. at Art. 4.
111. Id. at Art. 1.3.
112. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Text
1971) Art. 1, 2.
113. Id. at Art. 5.
114. Id. at Art. 7, 11 bis, 12.
115. Id. at Art. 10.
116. Id. at Art. 5.
117. Id. at Art. 6 bis.
118. TRIPS, Art. 10, 11.
119. Id. at Art. 10.1.
120. Id. at Art. 10.2
121. Id. at Art. 11.
122. Id. at Art. 14.
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to prohibit reproduction and rebroadcast of their works.' 23 The term
of protection for phonographic works is to be at least 50 years from
the end of the calendar year in which the work was fixed or
performed (except for protection afforded broadcasting
organizations which is to be 20 years).124
TRIPS also sets forth certain minimum requirements for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights.' 25 Article 41 provides, in
part:
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as
specified in this Part are available under their law so as to
permit effective action against any act of infringement of
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements
and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further
infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.
Procedures concerning the enforcement of intellectual
property rights shall be fair and equitable. They shall not be
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable
time limits or unwarranted delays.
TRIPS sets forth requirements regarding review of decisions, for
protecting confidential information in the course of legal
proceedings,27 and for taking evidence and obtaining discovery!
TRIPS further mandates that members give judicial authorities the
power to grant injunctions, 9 order the payment of damages adequate
to compensate the injured party for the infringement,'3 ° and grant
other remedies such as the destruction of infringing goods. 3'
123. Id. at Art. 14.1.
124. Id. at Art. 14.5.
125. Id. at Art. 41.
126. Id.
127. Id. at Art. 42.
128. Id. at Art. 43.
129. Id. at Art. 44.
130. Id. at Art. 45.
131. Id. at Art. 46.
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B. The DSU
The enforcement of TRIPS, as with the other substantive
agreement under the WTO, is governed by the Dispute Settlement
Understanding ("DSU"). 112 The DSU establishes a Dispute
Settlement Body ("DSB") to administer the dispute settlement
procedure and to: establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body
reports, maintain surveillance of implementations of rulings and
recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other
obligations under the covered agreements."' Under the DSU,
member countries are required to enter into consultations before the
institution of any proceedings."r' If this consultation process does not
resolve the matter, the aggrieved member can submit a request for
the establishment of a panel, which has the effect of commencing
legal proceedings (similar to filing a complaint in a civil action).135
Within certain prescribed time frames, a panel is established and
eventually hears evidence.' The panel is charged with making an
objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective
assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and
conformity with the relevant covered agreements.'
The panel's deliberations are confidential.' Once the panel
reaches its decision, it issues a report that is submitted to the DSB
and circulated to all members of the WTO. 3 9 Within 60 days, the
report must be adopted by the DSB unless a party to the dispute
gives notice of its intent to appeal or the DSB decides by consensus
not to adopt the report.' The DSU establishes a standing Appellate
Body to hear appeals from panel decisions. 14' The Appellate report
must be adopted by the DSB within 30 days after circulation to all the
members unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the
142
report.
In the event a panel or the Appellate Body determines that a
member's measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall
132. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
Art. 2.1 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter DSU]; 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
133. DSU, Art. 2.1.
134. Id. at Art. 2.1.
135. Id. at Art. 6.
136. Id. at Art. 7.
137. Id. at Art. 11.
138. TRIPS, Art. 14.1.
139. DSU, Art. 14.
140. Id. at Art. 16.4.
141. Id. at Art. 17.
142. Id. at Art. 17.14.
recommend that the member bring the measure into conformity with
the agreement. 41 In addition, the panel or Appellate Body may
suggest ways for the member to implement its recommendations.'"
Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, the time period from
establishment of the panel to the date the report is issued should not
exceed nine months, or twelve months when there is an appeal. 145
After adoption of the panel report or Appellate Body report, the
member against whom the decision is rendered must inform the DSB
of its intentions with respect to complying with the decision.146 When
there is disagreement as to whether the measures taken are
consistent with the member's obligations, the dispute is to be decided
through the DSU procedures, preferably by the original panel.147 The
DSB is charged with monitoring compliance and implementation of
the recommendations (i.e., keeping the matter under surveillance).' 8
If the member against whom a decision has been rendered does
not voluntarily comply with the ruling of the panel or the Appellate
Body within a reasonable time, the remedies available to the
aggrieved party are compensation (payment of money) or suspension
of concessions (usually retaliatory tariffs that discriminate against the
member who does not comply). 49 The aggrieved member must first
enter into negotiations with a view toward reaching agreement on the
amount of compensation." If this proves unsuccessful, then the
aggrieved member may request authorization from the DSB for
certain retaliatory suspension of concessions.' Suspension of
concessions (retaliatory action) should first seek to be applied in the
same economic sector as that in which the violation was found. If the
sanctions in the same sector are not practicable or effective, then
sanctions may be applied in other sectors under the same agreement
(of the numerous agreements under the WTO). Should that prove
impracticable or ineffective, sanctions may then be imposed with
respect to other covered agreements.'52
When there has been a violation of obligations under any of the
agreements covered by the WTO, the aggrieved member is entitled
143. Id.
144. Id. at Art. 19.
145. Id. at Art. 20.
146. Id. at Art. 21.3.
147. Id. at Art. 21.5.
148. Id. at Art. 21.6.
149. Id. at Art. 22.
150. Id. at Art. 22.2.
151. Id.
152. Id. at Art. 22.3.
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to recourse under the DSU, and must abide by its rules and
procedures.'53 In fact, members are prohibited from seeking recourse
except through the DSU."' Article 23.2 provides, in part:
[m]embers shall not make a determination to the effect that
a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or
impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the
covered agreements has been impeded, except through
recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules
and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any
such determination consistent with the findings contained in
the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or
an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding.
155
C. Strengths and Shortcomings of TRIPS and the DSU in Dealing
with Copyright Infringement over the Internet
It should be remembered that the WTO Agreements, including
TRIPS and the DSU, were negotiated in the time period from 1986 to
1993, and that substantive work concluded in 1991. This was before
the rapid expansion of the Internet, which occurred in the late 1990's,
so it is unlikely that the TRIPS negotiators anticipated or addressed
in any concrete way potential problems stemming from intellectual
property enforcement related to the Internet. Thus, specific fact
patterns related to Internet enforcement must be applied to the
general proscriptions contained in TRIPS.
The substantive provisions of TRIPS appear to provide a solid
basis for protecting copyrights in member countries worldwide.
TRIPS requires that member countries enact, maintain, and enforce
laws which provide a minimal level of protection for copyright
owners, giving such owners exclusive rights to reproduction and
broadcasting. TRIPS also strengthens and expands previous
protections under the Berne Convention by specifically addressing
computer programs, data bases, and sound recordings.157 This is
important because these areas are subject to digital transmission and
copying, and thus are particularly susceptible to infringement over
the Internet.
Setting aside the potential enforcement problems caused by
the technology itself, if the member countries were to diligently
153. Id. at Art. 23.1.
154. Id. at Art. 22.3.
155. Id.
156. TRIPS, Art. 10, 14.
157. Id. at Art. 10.
adhere to their substantive obligations under TRIPS, this would
result in an effective international system of copyright enforcement.
This ideal, of course, assumes that all member countries have the
resources and the political will to provide effective remedies against,
at the very least, blatant infringement and piracy. However, due to
the incredible volume of information and traffic over the Internet, for
even industrialized countries like the U.S., policing the Internet for
copyright infringement and providing effective remedies is a daunting
task. In the developing world, where countries have limited resources
and a plethora of more pressing economic and social problems than
intellectual property protection, expecting a high level of diligence,
or even cooperation, may prove difficult. Such problems are likely to
be exacerbated by the fact that there may be economic benefits,
which accrue to countries that allow infringers to set up their
businesses and servers in their territory. Similar factors have made
international enforcement of other laws difficult. For example, many
small countries have benefited in the past by having lax banking laws,
thereby attracting money launderers and tax evaders to utilize banks
in such countries.
158
Notwithstanding the relatively strong mandates with respect to
substantive protections that member countries must implement, as a
practical matter, TRIPS is likely to fall short of providing adequate
protection against copyright infringement over the Internet for
several reasons. First, TRIPS does not allow for any private right of
action by persons who are damaged by infringement. TRIPS and the
DSU may be enforced only by the member countries themselves, not
by any individualcitizens of such countries. 9 In the U.S., if a citizen
is aggrieved by the action (or inaction) of another member country,
the aggrieved person must petition the USTR, the agency
empowered by Congress to pursue actions under the DSU"
If the USTR fails to take up the matter and assist the aggrieved
party he has little or no recourse."' In fact, in the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Congress specifically mandated:
No person other than the United States
(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of
158. Rajeer Soxena, Cyberlaundering: The Next Stop for Money Launderers? 10 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 685, 691 (Spring 1998).
159. TRIPS, Art. 1.
160. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(B) (1994).
161. Id. § 3512(c).
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the Uruguay Round Agreements [which include TRIPS and
the DSU] or by virtue of congressional approval of such an
agreement, or
(B) may challenge, in any action brought under any
provision of law, any action or inaction by any department,
agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any
State, or any political subdivision of a State on the ground
that such action or inaction is inconsistent with such
162
agreement.
It remains to be seen how sensitive the USTR will be to requests
from smaller companies or industries for action against WTO and
TRIPS violations. One would expect that it probably will be much
more difficult for those without much political or economic clout to
get the attention of the USTR. Thus, a relatively small company
might find itself in the position of spending considerable resources
pursuing an infringement action in a foreign country, but unable to
obtain a just result because that country has not met its obligations
under TRIPS (either by failing to enact sufficient laws or by virtue of
a court system which cannot or will not enforce such laws). If, in such
a situation, the company cannot enlist the support of the USTR, then
infringement in the offending country can potentially continue
unchecked, and the aggrieved party will have no recourse. Practically
speaking, the solution to this dilemma is probably for smaller
companies in similar industries to consolidate their resources within
trade groups and more effectively lobby the USTR and Congress to
take up their case before the WTO. Nevertheless, the lack of any
recourse available to private parties, even in the face of blatant
violations of TRIPS, is a significant weakness in the international
enforcement system from the standpoint of copyright owners.
Another potential problem concerns the time it takes to obtain
relief for a violation of TRIPS, even in cases where the USTR
aggressively pursues a case under the DSU. If a copyright owner who
pursues an infringement action in a foreign country is denied relief in
a matter in violation of TRIPS, he may have already suffered
significant injury from the infringing activity occurring during the
prosecution of his litigation. Then, the infringement will be allowed
to continue during the pendency of the case before the DSB. The
DSB allows for 9 to 12 months from the request for a panel to the
rendering of a decision.163 Additional time is provided for the DSB to
attempt to secure compliance with the decision, and even then
162. Id.
163. DSU, Art. 6.
compliance is not assured.' 4 The DSB contains no provision for
injunctive relief, preliminary or otherwise. Given these potential
delays, an infringer would be free to reap substantial benefit with
impunity before any remedy is obtained by virtue of TRIPS
enforcement. The infringer who can continue offering infringing
material over his website and obtain the financial reward from its
continued existence might be able to attract an increasing number of
customers.
Other potential problems concern monitoring compliance, if and
when a favorable DSB decision is obtained. When a country has
failed to enact laws sufficient to meet the minimum substantive
requirements under TRIPS,165 then determining compliance is
relatively easy. In such cases, the DSB can monitor the legislation
passed by the offending country and determine whether it resolves
the shortcomings as determined by the panel or Appellate Body.
However, where the failure to comply with TRIPS concerns the
offending country's lack of enforcement of intellectual property laws
which it has already enacted, then monitoring compliance is
potentially much more complex.
Even in the best case scenario, where a favorable DSB ruling is
obtained, and there is no ambiguity about whether the offending
member country has complied, the injured party might not obtain
relief. The DSB is not empowered to award injunctive relief. Rather,
the DSB's only power to force compliance is to allow the prevailing
member country to take retaliatory measures, usually in the form of
punitive tariffs against the offending member.' 66 However, the
offending member is free to accept these sanctions in lieu of taking
any action toward compliance.' 67 This is exactly what has occurred in
two major DSU cases between the U.S. and the EU. In both the
Banana and the Beef Hormone cases, the U.S. obtained rulings that
EU legal restrictions were in violation of WTO provisions.168
Although the Banana case was affirmed on appeal in 1997,169 and the
164. Id.
165. See Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Chemical Products, WT/DS79/R (Aug. 24, 1998).
166. DSU, Art. 22.
167. Id.
168. USTR Press Release 01-23 (Apr. 11, 1999); USTR Press Release 99-43 (May 14,
1999).
169. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities B Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, AB-1997-3, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9,
1997).
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Beef Hormone case was affirmed in 1998,17 the EU refused to
comply with either ruling. Instead, for years, the EU opted to accept
the retaliatory measures imposed by the U.S.171
While the Banana and Beef Hormone cases did not involve
intellectual property rights, they illustrate a significant problem that
could arise in the IP context. If a ruling were obtained from the DSU
declaring that a member country was in violation of TRIPS, the
offending country would be free to ignore the ruling, and instead
tolerate the sanctions imposed by the prevailing member country.
This result, however, would leave the copyright owner or owners,
who might continue to suffer injury as a result of the offending
country's violation, without any recourse.
VI
Recent WIPO Treaties
The World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO")
recently facilitated two treaties that could have potential bearing on
international protection against copyright infringement over the
Internet: (1) the WIPO Copyright Treaty;172 and (2) the WIPO
Performances and Phonograms Treaty,73 each of which is discussed
below.
A. The WIPO Copyright Treaty
The WIPO Copyright Treaty was adopted in 1996.174 Article 1
provides that it is to be read in a manner that is consistent with the
Berne Convention.' Some of the main purposes of the WIPO
Copyright Treaty are: (1) to protect computer programs as literary
works;17 6 (2) to protect compilations of data;'77 (3) to maintain the
rights of authors to authorize rentals;'78 (4) to provide legal protection
170. WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), AB-1997-4. WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
171. In the Bananas case, the WTO authorized retaliation in April of 1999. USTR
Press Release 99-38 (Apr. 19, 1999). The Bananas case was finally settled in April, 2001.
USTR Press Release 01-23 supra n. 168. In the Beef Hormone case, in May, 1999, the U.S.
asked the WTO for authority to retaliate. USTR Press Release 99-43 supra n. 168.
172. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra n. 5.
173. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra n. 6.
174. WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra n. 5.
175. Id. at Art. 1.
176. Id. at Art. 4.
177. Id. at Art. 5.
178. Id. at Art. 7.
against the circumvention of protective technical measures;79 and (5)
to provide adequate legal remedies against knowing removal of
electronic rights management or distribution of materials in which
such has been removed.' "Electronic Rights Management" is
defined as:
[i]nformation which identifies the work, the author of the
work, the owner of any right in the work, or information
about the terms and conditions of use of the work, and any
numbers or codes that represent such information, when
any of these items of information is attached to a copy of a
work or appears in connections with the communication of
a work to the public. 8'
Items (4) and (5) above appear to have the greatest potential
application with respect to protection against infringement over the
Internet. Obviously, the development of technical measures to
combat infringement is an important part of a copyright owners
arsenal of weapons against infringement. This tool is strengthened
considerably when combined with legal prohibitions against
circumvention of technical measures.
Similarly, the prohibition against removal of electronic rights
management or distribution of materials is a useful tool to combat
infringement over the Internet. If a copyright owner can
electronically mark his work in such a way that conclusively identifies
it as his, this gives him a very easy means to prove actual copying in
any infringement action. Prohibiting removal of this data provides at
least marginal additional protection for the copyright owner.
B. The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty was adopted
in December 1996.82 It provides protection to performers with
respect to: (1) moral rights to be identified as the performer;'83 (2)
exclusive rights to authorize broadcasting and communication of
unfixed performances to the public;"8 (3) exclusive rights with respect
to fixation of unfixed performances;' (4) exclusive rights with
179. Id. at Art. 11.
180. Id. at Art. 12.
181. Id.
182. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, supra n. 6.
183. Id. at Art. 5.
184. Id. at Art. 6.
185. Id.
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respect to reproduction;" (5) exclusive rights with respect to
distribution of performances fixed in phonograms;'8 and (6) exclusive
rights with respect to rentals.'9 In addition, the following rights are
granted:
Performers shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing the
making available of their performances fixed in
phonograms, by wire or wireless means, in such a way that
members of the public may access them from a place and at
a time individually chosen by them.89
Similar provisions to those described above are set forth with respect
to the producers of phonograms.' 9
C. Effect of WIPO Treaties
It is not altogether clear that the WIPO Copyright Treaty or the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty provide any significant
additional protection beyond protection that was previously in
existence. The Berne Convention and TRIPS seem to cover most of
the same ground, although Berne and TRIPS are stated in more
general, far-sweeping terms. Certain provisions in the WIPO treaties,
however, seem to be directly tailored to address Internet or digital
related issues, and are thus potentially useful to copyright owners
who need to address infringement over the Internet. For example,
Articles 10 and 14 of the Performances and Phonograms Treaty
appear to be specifically designed to address the protection against
infringement over the Internet, as they concern the right to make
performances available by wire or wireless means at a time chosen by
the recipient. 9' To the extent the treaties explicitly grant protection
in such situations, they are potentially useful tools, since they leave
less room for an infringer to argue that his actions are not illegal due
to some unique characteristic of the Internet.
However, the WIPO treaties fall short of what is needed to
combat Internet-related infringement. They do not address the
complex and thorny issues of jurisdiction or choice of law. Nor do
they add anything to the mechanism for enforcement against
countries that fall short of providing the necessary level of protection.
186. Id. at Art. 7.
187. Id. at Art. 8.
188. Id. at Art. 9.
189. Id. at Art. 10.
190. Id. at Art. 11-14.
191. Id. at Art. 10, 14.
In fact, because the WIPO Agreements do not fall under the auspices
of the WTO, and because the DSU is not available, the International
Court of Justice ("ICJ") is the only mechanism available for
enforcing these treaties.'92 The ICJ is a relatively ineffective means to
enforce international agreements when compared to the DSU, as it is
easy for an offending country to decline the jurisdiction of the ICJ,
and to block and ignore its rulings with little consequence.1 93 The
DSU's structure prevents a country from avoiding jurisdiction and
blocking rulings against it, as rulings are automatically enforced
unless there is a consensus against doing So. 94 The DSU also has
mechanisms for authorizing retaliatory measures to attempt to force
compliance, while the ICJ is relatively toothless. 95 Thus, the WIPO
treaties are unlikely to have much of an impact on forcing countries
to comply with their obligations to enforce intellectual property laws.
In sum, while the WIPO treaties are useful in that they have set
forth some normative standards, they have proven to be relatively
unimportant in the overall scheme of international intellectual
property enforcement. There are no private rights of action under
these treaties, and despite the fact they have been in force for over
six years, no major decisions or changes in national laws appear to
have come about as a result of their adoption. TRIPS, which has the
benefit of enforcement under the DSU, has by far been the primary




A. Overview of NAFITA
In November 1993, the U.S., Canada and Mexico entered into
the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").'96 Chapter
17 of NAFTA contains detailed provisions related to intellectual
property. 97 Article 1701 requires the parties to, at a minimum, give
192. M. Cheek, The Limits of Informal Regulatory Cooperation in International
Affairs: A Review of the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 33 Geo.Wash. L. Rev. 277
(2001).
193. Id.; Douglas J. Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice: A Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61 Wash.
L. Rev. 145 (1986).
194. DSU, Art. 16.
195. Id. at Art. 22.
196. NAFTA, supra n. 7.
197. Id. at ch. 17, Art. 1701-2022.
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effect to other international conventions on intellectual property such
as the Berne Convention and the Paris Convention.198 Article 1703
requires the parties to afford national treatment to other parties.
99
Article 1705 of NAFTA contains detailed provisions relating to
requirements for copyright protection, and specifically provides that
computer programs and compilations of data are to be protected.
2 °°
Article 1706 requires protection for sound recordings with respect to
(a) reproduction; (b) importation; (c) distribution; and (d)
commercial rental. °1
NAFTA also contains specific and detailed provisions with
respect to protection for trademarks,' °2 patents, semiconductor
layouts,"' trade secrets , geographic indications,2° and industrial
designs. °7
Articles 1714 and 1715 of NAFTA address the requirements for
enforcing intellectual property rights.28 Article 1714 provides, in part:
[e]ach party shall ensure that enforcement procedures, as
specified in this Article and Articles 1715 through 1718, are
available under its domestic law so as to permit effective
action to be taken against any act of infringement of
intellectual property rights covered by this Chapter,
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements
and remedies to deter further infringements.
Such enforcement procedures are required to be fair and
equitable.210 Moreover, such procedures are required to have certain
minimum due process safeguards, such as timely written notice, the
right to counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to
211preserve confidential information.
198. Id. at Art. 1701.
199. Id. at Art. 1703.
200. Id. at Art. 1705.
201. Id. at Art. 1706.
202. Id. at Art. 1708.
203. Id. at Art. 1709
204. Id. at Art. 1710.
205. Id. at Art. 1711.
206. Id. at Art. 1712.
207. Id. at Art. 1713.
208. Id. at Art. 1714-1715.
209. Id. at Art. 1714.1.
210. Id. at Art. 1714.2.
211. Id. at Art. 2001-2022.
Chapter 20 of NAFTA addresses dispute settlement.2  The
procedure is similar to the DSU in that there are provisions for
consultations before the appointment of a hearing panel.21 ' There are
rules of procedure that must be followed during the hearing
process, 214 after which the panel must issue an initial report.2
1 5
Thereafter, a final report is to be issued 6.21 The parties to the dispute
then "shall agree on the resolution of the dispute, which normally
shall conform with the determinations and recommendations of the
panel., 217 If a party fails to implement the recommendations of the
panel, the other party is given the authority to suspend benefits under
the treaty. 8
B. Efficacy and Utilization of NAFFA
NAFTA's substantive intellectual property provisions are very
detailed and comprehensive, and in some respects arguably better
than those contained in TRIPS. However, contrary to the
expectations of many, NAFTA has not been a major means of
resolving disputes over intellectual property rights. According to the
Dispute Settlement Update issued by the USTR on May 18, 2001,
there were currently 16 disputes involving the U.S. and either Canada
or Mexico.21 9 Five out of the six disputes with Canada were pending
before the WTO, with the remaining one pending before a NAFTA
panel.2 Three out of the ten disputes between the U.S. and Mexico
were pending before the WTO, with the remaining seven before a
NAFTA panel.2  Only one of these disputes, a dispute between the
U.S. and Canada over U.S. patent law, involved intellectual property
rights, and that matter was before the WTO 2 According to the
Dispute Settlement Update issued by the USTR on March 29, 2002,
there were 8 disputes pending that involved the U.S. and either
Canada or Mexico. 3 Of those, only one was pending before a
NAFTA panel, and that dispute did not involve intellectual
212. Id. at Art. 2006-2008.
213. Id. at Art. 2006-2008.
214. Id. at Art. 2012.
215. Id. at Art. 2016.
216. Id. at Art. 2017.
217. Id. at Art. 2018.1.
218. Id. at Art. 2019.
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224property.22
Based on the foregoing, one can conclude that NAFTA has yet
to have any major impact on international intellectual property law,
despite its strong substantive provisions in this area. This may be a
function of the fact that there currently are only three countries that
are parties to NAFTA. If and when NAFTA is expanded to include
additional countries in Central and South America, as is being
discussed under the purview of the Free Trade Area of the Americas
("FTAA"), it will be worthwhile to monitor the extent to which
NAFTA's intellectual property provisions become more important.
VIII
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
A. Overview of Section 301 and Special 301
The statutory scheme commonly referred to as Section 301
(more completely, Rules 301 to 310 of the Trade Act of 1974)225 was
enacted in 1974 to combat what was perceived as unfair trade
practices by a number of foreign countries. In 1988, Section 301 was
amended to create a statutory scheme known as Special 301 to
specifically deal with unfair trade practices related to intellectual
226property.
Under Special 301, the USTR is required to submit an annual
report to the U.S. Congress identifying:
the acts, policies, or practices of each foreign country which
constitute significant barriers to, or distortions of property
protected by trademarks, patents, and copyrights exported
221
or licensed by United States persons.
If a country is identified as one with such acts, policies or practices (a
priority country) the USTR is required to include in its report to
Congress the remedial actions it has taken, which include the
remedies available under regular Section 301 .228 Among the
retaliatory measures that are available to the USTR under regular
Section 301 are a suspension of benefits under trade agreements with
224. Id.
225. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1996).
226. 19 U.S.C. § 2241 (1998).
227. Id. § 2241(a)(1).
228. Id. § 2241(b)(2).
the offending country and/or an imposition of tariffs.229
In practice, Special 301 has repeatedly been used to attempt to
leverage other countries into compliance with the U.S.' notion of fair
trading practices through the threat of sanctions.2 30 Few countries
have ever been placed on the priority list. 3 ' Rather, the USTR has
adopted a practice of placing offending countries into categories
short of priority status. For example, the USTR has deemed that
certain countries belong on lists labeled a "priority watch" or
"watch," even though such categories are not specifically provided
for in the statutory scheme. 32 This has enabled the USTR to create
leverage over offending countries without being boxed in by
Congress's mandate that it act quickly to impose sanctions or explain
why it will not.
The USTR has claimed that numerous successes have resulted
from its use of Special 301. The following statement from the USTR's
Special 301 report dated May 1, 2000 is illustrative:
Brazil and Thailand were designated as priority countries in
1993, while China was similarly designated in 1994 and 1996,
and Paraguay in 1997. Those designations led to subsequent
agreements and/or actions which are described therein.
Even with respect to countries that were not placed in the
priority category, the USTR has claimed success resulting from the
use of Special 301. For example, the following statement was made
with respect to Hungary:
Hungary, which had been placed on the Special 301 'priority
watch list,' concluded a comprehensive bilateral agreement
with the United States in July 1993, agreeing to provide
234patent protection.
The USTR stated the following with respect to Hong Kong,
which again intimates a strong causal relationship between USTR
action under Special 301 and compliance with U.S. desires (i.e.,
229. Id. § 2411(c).
230. See USTR Special Reports to Congress and USTR Fact Sheets Monitoring and
Enforcing Trade Laws and Agreements (1995-2000).
231. See id.
232. See id.; 19 U.S.C. §2411; Mark J. Murphy, International Bribery: An Example of
an Unfair Trade Practice? 21 Brook. J. Intl. L. 385 (1995).
233. USTR Fact Sheet Monitoring and Enforcing Trade Laws and Agreements, supra
n. 9.
234. Id.
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demands), even in the area of enforcement of piracy over the
Internet:
After the results of out-of-cycle review [by the USTR] were
announced in January 1998, new anti-piracy legislation
requiring licensing and inspection of CD production sites
was passed. After an out-of-cycle review announcement in
December 1999, Hong Kong took legislative action to
reclassify piracy as an organized and serious crime,
extended the mandate of its special anti-piracy task force,
and engaged in vigorous enforcement actions against
software and other copyright piracy. Hong Kong recently
conducted significant enforcement actions against Internet
piracy.23
5
B. Continued Viability of Section 301
There is a serious question as to whether Section 301 can
continue as a viable tool after the U.S.' ratification of the WTO.
Section 301 clearly conflicts with Section 23.2(a) of the DSU, which
provides that members shall:
not make a determination to the effect that a violation has
occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or
that the attainment of any objective of the covered
agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to
dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and
procedures of this Understanding.236
Since 1995, when the U.S. joined the WTO, the USTR has
pursued at least three cases to the stage of announcing sanctions
under Section 301, then suddenly abandoned the Section 301 process
and taken the case before the DSU.237 Although the USTR has
continued to publicly state that it believes Section 301 does not
conflict with Article 23.2,238 its actions in these cases seem to belie
these pronouncements.
Section 301 continues to be resented by many countries outside
the U.S., as an example of aggressive unilateralism by which the U.S.
judges trade policies solely by American standards, to protect narrow
235. Id. (emphasis added).
236. DSU, Art. 23.2(a).
237. WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities B Regime for the
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, supra n. 169; WTO Appellate Body
Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), supra n. 170.
238. See e.g. USTR Press Release 99-102 (Dec. 22, 1999).
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American interests. 239 In 1998, the EC brought a case before the DSB
challenging Section. 301. In a complex decision (the nuances of which
are beyond the scope of this article), the DSB found that Section 301
is, on its face, inconsistent with the DSU because it allows (perhaps
sometimes even mandates) the USTR to take retaliatory action with
respect to matters within the jurisdiction of the WTO without
utilizing the DSU. 40 In particular, the DSB recognized that, under
Section 301, the USTR is required to determine whether another
country has violated the terms of the WTO, irrespective of whether
the DSB adopted a panel or Appellate Body finding on the matter. 241
The DSB also recognized that Section 301 mandates that, after a
DSB panel has rendered a decision, the USTR must decide whether
the panel's recommendations have been adequately implemented,
irrespective of whether a DSB has made that determination.242 If the
USTR finds that the implementation is inadequate, it must then
determine what further action to take and then implement that
action, irrespective of whether the procedures under the DSU have
been completed. 43
These provisions of Section 301, on their face, appear to be
clearly inconsistent with Article 23.2(c) of the DSU. However, the
DSB found that there was no violation, due in large part to a
Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA"), pursuant to which the
U.S. stated that it would not use Section 301 in a manner inconsistent
with the DSU.24 4 The USTR promised that sanctions would not be
imposed under Section 301 unless a decision consistent with such
sanctions was first reached by the DSB.245 The DSB accepted the
USTR's argument, even though it was inconsistent with the language
of Section 301 itself, which mandates that the USTR take certain
action irrespective of action taken by the DSB.246 In other words, the
DSB accepted the USTR's promise that it would comply with Article
23.2(c) of the DSU, even such compliance would violate its
obligations under Section 301.
If the USTR were taken at its word with respect to its position in
239. Alan C. Swan, Symposium: Prevention and Settlement of Economic Disputes
between Japan and the United States, 16 Ariz. J. of Intl. and Comp. L. 37 (Winter 1999).
240. Panel Report, United States Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, Case No.
WT/DS152/R, 99-5454 (Dec. 22,1999) (hereinafter "DSB Section 301 Decision").
241. Id. (citing Section 304(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §2414(a)).)
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the above-described DSU case, this would appear to have completely
emasculated Section 301. Hence, if the USTR will not impose any
sanctions under Section 301 without first obtaining a decision from
the DSB, Section 301 is effectively subsumed into the WTO, because
(short of threats) it provides no more of an enforcement tool than the
DSU does. Previously, if a country was placed on a priority or
priority watch list, it had to be concerned that the U.S. would initiate
unilateral retaliatory action. Now, countries must know that being
placed on such a list is no more than a threat by the U.S. to institute
proceedings under the DSU.2 47 As a result, unless there is a major
policy shift by the USTR, even vigorous saber rattling under Special
301 will not result in more international protection for intellectual
property than under TRIPS and the DSU in the future.
Ix
Conclusion and Proposed Solutions to Enforcement Problems
Currently, TRIPS appears to be the most substantial measure by
which to ensure that intellectual property rights are recognized and
enforced globally. Thus, a copyright owner who is unable to obtain
adequate relief through judicial or political processes in a country
that is providing a haven for infringement has little legal recourse.
Such a copyright owner can seek the assistance of the USTR to
utilize the DSU to force compliance by the offending country.
However, if the USTR declines to pursue the matter, the copyright
owner cannot force it to do so. Nor can the copyright owner file a
petition before the WTO. A relatively small copyright owner without
political clout will likely be at a severe disadvantage in comparison to
large corporate interests that have the power to command the
attention of the USTR. This illustrates a fundamental unfairness in
the current system: a small copyright owner with a strong grievance
involving blatant infringement of his or her copyright can be given
less favorable treatment than a large competitor with a less
meritorious claim. The most practical solution available to small
copyright owners is to band together in sufficient numbers to form
trade groups so that the USTR will find them difficult to ignore.
Further development of the current international system should
also be considered. Most obviously, TRIPS could be amended to
247. Although the above-discussed DSU case addressed only Regular 301, there is
little or no basis to say that the problematic nature of the decision, or of the USTR's
position in the case, is any different with respect to Special 301.
allow individuals and business entities to file grievances directly
against countries that refuse to comply with TRIPS. A mechanism
could also be set up to screen out marginal cases so that the DSU
would not be overwhelmed by the volume of cases. However, this
solution is probably politically unfeasible, given the aversion many
countries have to the litigious nature of the U.S. system. In the U.S.
there would also likely be opposition from those who feel that this
country already has ceded too much of its sovereignty to the WTO.
Certainly, in the U.S., it likely would be even more controversial for a
Japanese corporation to force a change in U.S. law through a DSU
proceeding than it would be for the Japanese government to do so
through quiet diplomacy and lobbying. Allowing private litigants to
file actions also would require the DSU infrastructure to expand
vastly in order to handle its increased caseload. It is questionable
whether the international community would be willing to provide the
funding necessary to achieve and maintain such a system, and to cede
so much authority to the WTO.
Another, less radical approach would be to add provisions to
TRIPS that more clearly define and address issues of jurisdiction,
choice of law, and enforcement of foreign judgments. For example,
treaty provisions could: (1) expressly grant jurisdiction to any
member country (the "First Country") in which material is available
over the Internet that violates the copyright laws of that First
Country; and (2) require any other member country (the "Second
Country") to enforce a judgment by the First Country in regards to
the violation. Such a provision would allow copyright owners to sue
to enforce their rights in their own countries, and at the same time
enable them to obtain international relief. Thus, for example, a U.S.
copyright owner would be able to sue in U.S. Federal Court to shut
down an infringing website in Panama, and a Panamanian court
would be obligated to enforce that judgment. However, such a
provision would be unlikely to find support, as it would be viewed as
ceding too much power to the foreign courts. Even in the U.S.,
support for such a treaty provision would likely find opposition due
to certain scenarios in which the U.S. does not agree with the level of
rights enforced. For example, the U.S. would undoubtedly prefer not
to enforce a judgment of a European court enforcing moral rights.
Another potential tool to protect against copyright infringement
is the inherent power of the International Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers ("ICANN"). ICANN has the power, through
various organizations, to assign domain names to persons or entities
that wish to establish websites. ICANN also has the power to take
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domain names away, if the owner of a trade name establishes that
such a domain name infringes on its trade name. ICANN has
established a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy and
Rules for Uniform Name Dispute Resolution Policy, to address
disputes between domain name holders and the owners of potentially
conflicting trade names. The Policy and Rules are (at least arguably)
binding on the holder of the domain names by virtue of the fact that
each such holder is required to agree to abide by such conditions
before being issued his rights to the domain name.
The power granted to ICANN over domain names is
extraordinary, and provides a potentially powerful tool for policing
the Internet. Domain names (and related URLs) are a necessity for
everyone who does business over the Internet through a website,
since, by definition, it is not practically possible to operate a website
without a domain name. The potential loss of a domain name,
especially one that has acquired popularity, could be devastating to
its registered owner. Thus, ICANN's power over domain names is a
pressure point in the Internet governance system, which is without
compare.
ICANN already has established procedures for withdrawing
domain names from persons who infringe on one type of intellectual
property right, namely trademarks and trade names. It is not a
gigantic leap to envision giving ICANN additional authority to
discourage copyright infringement.
One possible scenario as to how ICANN could be used to police
copyright infringement over the Internet is as follows. If the owner of
a copyright finds that a website is being utilized for infringement, he
could file suit against the infringer in the jurisdiction of his choice.
ICANN could then be made a party to this suit as a necessary party
under rules similar to Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In its prayer for relief, the copyright owner could seek an
order that the infringer's domain name be canceled or withdrawn.
This would allow the copyright owner, if he prevails on the merits of
his infringement claim, to have the effective remedy of shutting down
the website, regardless of where the infringer's server is located.
Of course, unscrupulous infringers will undoubtedly switch to
different domain names if they are determined to continue infringing.
However, this possibility could be effectively minimized if there were
a mechanism for denying repeat copyright infringers the right to
continue to apply for domain names. This mechanism would be based
on the rationale that, in order to obtain the privilege of applying for a
domain name, persons should be required to refrain from blatant
violations of law, such as repeat copyright infringement (i.e., piracy).
It is equitable to deny individuals who have demonstrated their intent
to use the Internet for illegal purposes access to tools for doing
business over the Internet. Such a rule would be somewhat
cumbersome to enforce; ICANN would be forced to investigate the
backgrounds of individuals affiliated with corporations and other
legal entities like partnerships and LLCs in order to assure that
repeat infringers are not allowed to hide behind the veil of such
entities.
Of course numerous arguments can be made in opposition to
using ICANN as a tool to police the Internet against copyright
infringement. The most compelling argument is that ICANN already
has too much power over the Internet, especially for an organization
whose source of authority is ambiguous at best, and perhaps even
questionable.' One could imagine the possibility that copyright
owners with weak cases (at least under U.S. law) would shop for an
alternate forum. Assuming the copyright owner obtains a favorable
ruling from such forum, he would have the ability to shut down the
allegedly offending website worldwide, even in countries in which the
website operator's actions don't amount to infringement. For
example, the U.S. would likely object to a situation in which a
popular website were shut down because of a judgment obtained
from a European court on the basis of moral rights. In such a
situation, the website operator's actions would be completely legal in
the U.S., yet, U.S. residents would be deprived of access to such a
website.
Due to the fact that the Internet is so pervasive and that websites
can be accessed from all corners of the world, it will be difficult to
move toward significant improvement in the international system of
protection against Internet copyright infringement without resolving
conflicts over the appropriate level of protection to be given to
copyrights. Unless and until there is a higher level of consensus as to
what should be protected and be allowed, some countries' desire for
aggressive enforcement of copyright laws is likely to conflict with
other countries' interests in protecting other rights. The conflict
between the EU and the U.S. over moral rights is just one example of
such a difference. A move towards international harmony in
substantive law would go a long way toward developing procedural
mechanisms for combating international copyright infringement. If
there were a more consistent substantive law, there would likely be
248. This is one reason that the author has not suggested that copyright disputes
should be resolved by ICANN itself.
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less international opposition to the extraterritorial reach of one
country's jurisdiction if that country were successful in shutting down
a website which was popular in other countries. With more harmony,
there would also be less opposition to the policing of copyright
infringement by an international body or organization such as the
DSB or ICANN.
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